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As previous readers of my blogs on this topic will know, for much of the last year I (along with Michael O’Connor) have been pressing HMRC and DWP to release more data on how many National Insurance numbers issued to EU nationals are actually in use. Last Thursday, we edged closer to an answer.
With the decision to leave the EU, there has been much discussion about whether the UK will enter recession. This blog provides some information of the frequency of recessions in recent UK economic history, and puts into context the probability of recession in the aftermath of the referendum.
What do today’s labour market statistics tell us about what’s going to happen to the UK labour market as a result of the referendum result? On the face of it, not much. The headline figures for employment, unemployment and so on are based on Labour Force Survey data for the months for April to June (and the changes are calculated with respect to the three months prior to that). The “single month” statistics do show a small uptick in unemployment (from its April low of 4.8% to 5.1%) - but these numbers are volatile, which is why the ONS doesn’t use them as the headline.
This is a guest blog by Richard Disney, Professor of Economics at the University of Sussex, A Visiting Professor in the Department of Economics, University College, London, and a Research Fellow of the Institute for Fiscal Studies.
[This is my contribution to the VoxEU e-book "Brexit Beckons: Thinking Ahead by leading economists", which is available for (free) download here. It is edited by Richard Baldwin and includes contributions from my NIESR colleague Angus Armstrong and many others]
One reason for the UK leaving the EU was the promise of ‘taking back control’ of trade policy. The UK would give up its influence and vote on EU policies in return for the freedom to negotiate its own trade agreements with countries around the world.
A month ago, I, along with several of my colleagues from the UK in a Changing Europe programme, other academics, and politicians from both the Leave and Remain campaign, signed a letter to the Daily Telegraph calling on the government to guarantee the rights of EU citizens currently living in the UK:
The UK’s decision to leave the EU is a watershed event. It may bring to an end the free movement of labour and limit the free trade of goods and services between the UK and EU. This follows hot on the heels of the fragmentation of international finance in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. How world leaders respond will determine whether Brexit is a set-back to globalisation, or part of deeper retrenchment.
Before the referendum, it appeared that a Brexit vote would mean that the UK faced a clear choice on immigration policy. If we wanted as far as possible to retain access to the Single Market, either by maintaining membership of the European Economic Area (like Norway) or via a series of bilateral agreements (like Switzerland) then we would need to accept that freedom of movement would continue much as now. Recognising this – and regarding it as an unacceptable price to pay – both UKIP and, eventu
A week is a short time in economics. So what , if anything, have we learned about the economic impact of the UK’s vote to leave the European Union? I would highlight four key points.
Uncertainty has gripped financial markets in the UK and around the world. The immediate response this morning has been unprecedented in the post Bretton Woods era. In the space of six hours sterling has fallen around 10 per cent against the dollar to the lowest level for 31 years. Stock market futures indicate that the equity markets will fall by around 10%. Further gyrations are expected over the coming days and weeks as market participants grapple with the implications of the results. The response so far reflects a weaker expected economic outlook at home and abroad.
The Prime Minister's foolish pledge to reduce net immigration to the tens of thousands has come back to bite him. It ensured that the key question for the referendum was whether the ability to "take control" of immigration policy was worth the risk to the UK economy from Brexit. The electorate have given their verdict.
The economic consequences of leaving the EU have naturally been a central focus of the referendum campaign. As June 23 draws near we bring together the conclusions from our research on the likely consequences, and reflect on some of the claims made.
It is difficult to overstate the damage that has been done to UK politics and policy by the Prime Minister’s foolish pledge – made against the advice of almost anyone who knew anything about the subject – to reduce net immigration to the tens of thousands. It has proved to be an act of economic self-harm; as well as unnecessarily excluding tens of thousands of skilled workers from outside the EU, we are actually losing global market share in a key export sector – higher education – where we have a strong comparative advantage. But it has also reduced trust in politics and politicians; vot
We are fortunate to have a consensus of views on the negative impact of leaving the EU. This note explains how a rational agent should "consume" this advice. Theory tends to say that we should be wary of the motivation of those who forecast at the extreme but that we should still put weight on the central case.
There is now little doubt that immigration will be the issue that will decide the referendum result. But it is danger of being decided on fiction rather than facts about its impact. We have never needed evidence about migration more. We do know a lot. We know that any statistical effects of migration on jobs and wages are very small. But statistics are often mistrusted.
In our recent report here we assessed a potential effect of Brexit on low income families. In particular, the potential changes to welfare payments that might follow after Brexit. We combined projected changes in national income with the spirit of the Government’s Fiscal Charter. Our results suggest that the effect on the incomes of the low income families could be substantial.