Conference and seminar output

CEO Bonding: Who Posts Performance Bonds and Why?

Despite their theoretical value in tackling principal-agent problems at low cost to firms there is almost no empirical literature on the prevalence and correlates of performance bonds posted by corporate executives. Using data for China we examine their incidence and test propositions from principal-agent theory regarding their correlates. Around one-tenth of corporations deploy performance bonds. They are sizeable relative to CEO cash compensation.

The Market for Executives in China's Publicly Listed Companies

Presentation at the CEP's labour workshop on the labour market for top executives in China's publicly listed firms, 2001-2010

Employee Stock Purchase Plans - Gift or Incentive?

Key note address to POEK 2012 Personnel Economics Conference, Paderborn, Germany

Human Capital, Matching and Job Satisfaction

Using a model of wage determination developed by Stevens (2003) we offer an explanation of why tenure has a negative effect when entered in job satisfaction equations. If job satisfaction measures match quality, then the explanation follows from a model of the labour market in which workers accumulate specific human capital at the firm they work and the way in which this accumulation affects the way workers react to outside job opportunities.

Quality and outcomes in secondary schools in England

Presented at INDICSER workshop, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels

The role of quality adjustment in assessing the performance of health services

Presented at INDICSER mid-term conference, Valencia

Quality and outcomes in early years education

Presented at INDICSER mid-term conference, Valencia

Quality and outcomes in early years education in England

Presented at ECERS International Workshop, University of Oxford

Why Are Migrants Paid More?

In efficient global labour markets for very high wage workers one might expect wage differentials between migrant and domestic workers to reflect differences in labour productivity. However, using panel data on worker-firm matches in a single industry over a seven year period we find a substantial wage penalty for domestic workers which persists within firms and is only partially accounted for by individual labour productivity. We show that the differential partly reflects the superstar status of migrant workers.

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