

2019 UK GENERAL ELECTION BRIEFING

PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF IMMIGRATION

Andrew Aitken, Chiara Manzoni and Johnny Runge
National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR)

OVERVIEW

Immigration was one of the main issues around the UK's decision to leave the EU. The outcome of the General Election is likely to determine the design of a future immigration system, with party proposals ranging from the introduction of a post-Brexit "Australian-style" points system, to continuing free movement within the EU. This briefing focuses on:

- The trends in UK immigration, and data about the migrant population;
- The economic and social impacts of immigration; and public concerns about immigration;
- Present and future immigration policy including the different proposals by the main parties.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- Immigration has been part and parcel of British life throughout the last thousand years. But there has been a **substantial increase in net migration during the past two decades**. Immigration has **fundamentally changed the UK population**; now made up of 14% foreign-born people compared to 9% in 2004.
- According to the available evidence, **immigration has generally had a small impact** on most easily measurable outcomes such as wages, employment, and productivity. Immigration appears to have had an overall **positive impact** on public finances, with migrants generally contributing more on average to public finances through taxes than they consume in welfare payments and public services.
- The impacts cannot be seen in isolation from government policies. **Successive UK governments have not responded adequately to the rise in population levels**, by failing to invest the financial windfall from migration into public services and housing. As a result, the UK public do not associate immigration with positive impacts, which has arguably driven anti-immigrant sentiments.
- The UK is often associated with anti-immigrant attitudes, but **public opinion has actually become more positive in the past two decades**. And while the UK is **divided on immigration**, there is also a lot of common ground, particularly the preference for high-skilled workers and those migrants who contribute positively to the UK economy and society.


- Polling suggests that **immigration has declined as a political issue**, but while people have turned their attention to the UK's future relationship with the EU, immigration is never far away from public consciousness, and it **could quickly reappear at the centre of public debate**, especially if the future immigration system is not deemed to respond to public concerns.
- **Significant uncertainty over the actual numbers of immigrants in the UK** make informed debate and analysis of immigration policy difficult.

Trends and history of immigration in the UK

- **UK has always been a country of immigration, as outlined in a recent book by [Jonathan Portes](#) and by [Robert Winder](#)**, which this section is based on. Sometimes, public debate appears to assume that large-scale immigration only started after the Second World War. In fact, a thousand years ago, the population was already a mix of Britons, Angles, Saxons, Celts, Danes and so on. Throughout the following centuries up until the 18th century, there were a continued influx of Italians, Flemings, Dutch, French, Spanish, Irish and Jewish immigrants, often invited and encouraged to come to contribute to industries such as textile, papermaking and moneylending. **The period between the 18th and 19th century did not see influxes on the same scale**, though there were still no formal controls on immigration. In fact, by contrast, for a period there were legal barriers that prevented skilled craftsmen in leaving the country. Despite the limited immigration flows, the Alien Immigration Act of 1905, followed by further legislation throughout the 1920s and 1930s, represented **the first UK legislation that sought to apply systematic restrictions to immigration**.
- **After the Second World War and until the 1990s, immigration inflows picked up**, including the arrival of New Commonwealth immigrants such as Empire Windrush with Caribbean migrants, Indians, African Asians, Bangladeshis and East Europeans. The Alien Immigration Act never covered 'subjects of the crown' in its restrictions, and the Nationality Act of 1948 reaffirmed the rights of Commonwealth countries and extended it to newly independent colonies such as India, Pakistan and the Caribbean Islands. While New Commonwealth immigrants were largely welcomed and helped to alleviate labour shortages, there were also tensions, manifested most famously by the Nottingham and Notting Hill riots in 1958, as well as Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech in 1968. **Tighter immigration restrictions were introduced, and by the 1970s immigration from the New Commonwealth countries had largely subsided**, through the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts of 1962 and 1968, the Immigration Act of 1971 and the British Nationality Act of 1981.
- **Immigration only re-emerged as a political issue after 1997 when immigration increased to an unprecedented scale**, caused initially by globalisation, people fleeing armed conflict, and the introduction of more liberal immigration policies. **The biggest turning point was the decision to give immediate labour market access in 2004 to citizens of new EU member states in Eastern and Central Europe**. This resulted in a large surge between 2004 and 2008; then a temporary slowdown between 2008 and 2012 during the financial crisis and the subsequent recession; then another surge between 2012 and 2016 including from Southern European countries as well as Bulgaria and Romania whose transitional controls expired in 2014.
- Just as the relationship between Britain and the Commonwealth countries shaped migration flows and legislation in the post-war period, the UK's relationship with the EU has shaped it since the

2000s. It culminated in the decision to leave the EU in the 2016 referendum, but **decisions around the future immigration system have not yet been settled**. In the meantime, Figure 1 shows that net EU migration has fallen dramatically since peak levels in 2015/2016. The fall has been largely offset by non-EU immigration which has increased steadily since 2013, so overall net migration is still fairly high: there were **212,000 more people who moved to the UK during the past year than left the UK**.

Figure 1: Net migration by citizenship, UK, year ending December 2009 to year ending June 2019




Note: Office for National Statistics – Long-Term International Migration (LTIM), LTIM with preliminary adjustments based on Department for Work and Pensions and Home Office data. Source: [Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: November 2019](#).

The migrant population in the UK

- While the UK has always been a country of immigrants, the unprecedented rise in immigration during the past decades has **fundamentally changed the country’s population**. There are several ways that migrants can be defined. Commonly used data on immigration in the UK define migrants by either country of birth, or citizenship.
- But it hasn’t changed quite as much as we think. British people consistently [overestimate](#) the proportion of migrants in the UK, believing that around a quarter of the population are migrants, when it is almost half that, at **around 14% of the UK population, up from about 7% of the population in 1995**. Overall, since 2004, the number of foreign-born people in the UK has **almost doubled from 5 million to almost 9 million**, but since 2017, the **migrant population has been relatively constant or even declined** (Figure 2).
- However, there is **significant uncertainty over the number of immigrants in the UK**. Unlike many European countries, there is **no official count of the number of immigrants living in the UK**. The numbers above are from the Labour Force Survey/Annual Population Survey (APS) which is currently the only official source used to estimate the number of migrants in the UK. The other


source of migration statistics is the International Passenger Survey (IPS) which is conducted at ports throughout the UK, from which various adjustments are made to create the Long Term International Migration (LTIM) figures. These are used to estimate net migration (Figure 2), but they have recently been downgraded from 'official statistics' to 'experimental statistics' by the ONS because of concerns over its coverage and weighting.ⁱ There are **substantial inconsistencies between the two surveys**. For instance, the IPS suggests that net migration (inflows minus outflows) has been consistently positive, close to 300,000 a year (Figure 3), while the APS suggests that the migrant population has been fairly constant since 2016, suggesting that net migration is close to zero.ⁱⁱ

Figure 2: LFS quarterly estimates of the immigrant population, 2010-2019



Source: Authors' calculations from the quarterly Labour Force Survey.


Figure 3: IPS/LTIM quarterly estimates of yearly changes in the immigrant population, 2011-2019



Source: Authors' calculations from the IPS/LTIM.

- Immigrants form a particularly large proportion of the population in **parts of the country, especially London and the South East.**


Figure 4: Regional distribution of foreign-born population, 2018



Source: Authors' calculations from the Labour Force Survey.

- **Poland is, by far, the most common country of birth** for immigrants in the UK.


Figure 5: Non-British population in the UK, by country of birth, 2019



Source: Annual Population Survey, ONS.

- It is not just the scale of migration, but also the type of migrants that people get wrong. Driven by media coverage, Brits tend to think that refugees and asylum seekers form a large part of the migrant population, when in fact in 2018 only 0.6% of the UK population was [estimated](#) to be made up of people who originally came to the UK to seek asylum. Instead, the **most common types of migrants in the UK are those who immigrate to work, study and be with family**. Figure 6 shows the pattern of immigration by the two main reasons for coming to the UK – work and study. Since the 2016 referendum migration for work has declined, while migration for study has increased slightly.

Figure 6: Long-term immigration trends by reason for migration, UK, year ending June 2009 to year ending June 2019



Source: [Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: November 2019](#).


Impacts of immigration

- How have the changes to the UK population affected the country? Often, the discussion around immigration focuses on two types of impacts: **economic impacts** (on jobs, wages, public finances and public services, housing, productivity and GDP) and **social impacts** (such as integration, cohesion, well-being, national identity and crime).
- It is [often stated](#) that immigrants take the jobs or drive down the wages of British workers. However, all existing research evidence – summarised in a detailed [NIESR briefing](#) and in a recent [report](#) by the government’s independent Migration Advisory Committee – suggest **immigration has had little impact on the number of jobs or wages of UK native workers**. There is some [evidence](#) of a small negative impact on the wages of lower skilled workers, while the effect on the rest of the distribution is positive. Recent [work](#) finds small negative effects on the wages of native workers in the semi/unskilled service sector.
- Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the essence of this research by showing the **relationship between changes in the proportion of immigrants in a local area, with the changes in the employment rate for natives and in their wages, respectively**. The dotted line summarises this relationship: if immigration reduced the employment or wage prospects of British natives, we would expect to see a strong downward sloping line, which would mean that more immigrants were correlated with lower employment rates and wages for natives. However, Figure 7 shows only a slight negative correlation over the period 2011-2019 between the change in migrant share and the change in UK-born employment. Figure 8 shows a small positive correlation between the change in migrant share and the change in wages. This positive correlation between immigrant share and wages is not surprising as immigrants are likely to be attracted to areas where wages are growing, however the

best [evidence](#) that attempts to take this into account to estimate the **causal impact of immigration on employment and wages tends to find no, or little negative effect.**


- How do we explain that immigration does not affect employment prospects of natives? While it is true that if an immigrant takes a job, a British person cannot take that specific job, this does not necessarily mean that UK unemployment goes up. The number of jobs or vacancies in an economy is not fixed. If an immigrant gets a job, they will earn money, pay taxes and spend most of the money in the UK. As such, higher immigration will **increase the demand for goods and services in the UK, which may create new jobs and raise wages.** Overall, levels of employment and wages are driven more by other things such as productivity, education and training, and the tax and benefits system.

Figure 7: Change in immigrant share and employment rate of UK born residents, 2011-2019



Note: The figure shows the percentage change in the employment rate for the UK born population in each area against the percentage point change in the immigrant share (working age population). Derived from an average of four quarters of 2011 and the first three quarters of 2019. Source: Authors' calculations from the Labour Force Survey.

Figure 8: Change in immigrant share and hourly wages of UK born residents, 2011-2019



Note: The figure shows the percentage change in the hourly wage rate (hrrate) for the UK born population in each area against the percentage point change in the immigrant share (working age population). Derived from an average of four quarters of 2011 and the first three quarters of 2019. Source: Authors' calculations from the Labour Force Survey.

- People often argue that immigrants, sometimes with reference to low-skilled EU migrants, may have caused a decline in productivity, for instance by reducing incentives of employers to invest in labour-saving or productivity-enhancing technologies. But there are also several ways migrants could push up productivity, for instance through innovation and knowledge transfer, or by providing complementary skills enabling higher-skilled natives to move into higher-skilled jobs, or by giving natives incentives to acquire new skills. Overall, the emerging evidence, including that of the government’s independent [Migration Advisory Committee](#) is **uncertain about the impact of immigration on productivity**, with some evidence of positive effects.
- One of the most prevalent concerns about immigration is that it puts a [strain on public services](#). And it is true that migrants, like everyone else, use public transport and public services such as the NHS and schools, and they claim benefits. But they also pay taxes which fund these services. So, the question of whether migrants affect the quality of public services is primarily a question about whether immigrants cost more by using public services than they contribute through taxes. And there is [evidence](#) which shows that **immigrants overall pay more in than they take out**, mainly because they are young, healthy, typically in work, and they are often not resident in the UK during the parts of the lifecycle where you are a financial strain on the state such as when you are in schooling or retired. Migrant workers also contribute in other important ways to the NHS by filling important [labour market](#) shortages as nurses and doctors. In schools, while migrants are a higher fraction of the pupil population than the school workforce, [studies](#) show that higher numbers of pupils with English as a second language does not affect parental school choice or attainment among native pupils.

- The evidence on the effect of immigration on house prices is mixed. At least one [study](#) finds a negative effect of immigration on house prices, due to existing residents moving away from areas experiencing an increase in migration. More recently, the Migration Advisory Committee found some evidence that migration leads to a rise in house prices, but this evidence is not very robust. Arguably, the **main driver of the rise in housing costs is the dysfunctional nature of the UK housing market**, in which new houses are not being built at the required pace to keep up with population changes.ⁱⁱⁱ
- Overall, immigration over the last couple of decades has probably had a small positive impact on public finances, possibly some positive effects on productivity, and no or little impact on overall employment and wages. But the **economic impacts of migration cannot be seen in isolation from government policies, particularly on public services and housing**. Even if migrants contribute positively to public finances and this contribution, in theory, could be used to maintain or even improve the standard of public services, this is of [little comfort](#) in practice if the UK government fails to adjust public infrastructure to rising population levels. If the provision of public services, infrastructure and housing fails to keep pace with both natural increase and net migration, then the availability and quality of these services is likely to fall; a situation made worse, if for example, the overall net gain to the public finances is used on other priorities, such as tax cuts. Similarly, successive UK governments have failed [to train enough health care staff](#) and social workers and instead relied on migrant labour to fill labour shortages, it is natural that the UK public connect migration with the lack of investment in the domestic labour force.
- Economic impacts are only part of the story. As we have seen, immigration has changed the UK which is now a visibly and recognisably multi-ethnic society. However, the **impacts on things like integration, community cohesion, well-being, and national identity are more diverse and harder to measure, partly because some of them are largely subjective**. One of the social impacts that can be measured is the impact on crime. [Available evidence](#) suggest that **migrants are not more likely to commit crime than similar natives**, including in [studies](#) examining recent waves of Central and Eastern European migrants.

Immigration policy: past, present and future

- The UK has a centralised migration system through the Home Office which is responsible for the country's immigration policy at a national level. Current UK policy for immigration and asylum **distinguish between UK and non-EU migrants and asylum seekers**. For EU migrants, the freedom of movement of people within the EU applies, while non-EU migrants are required a visa. Table 1 provides an overview of UK immigration and asylum policies.

The UK immigration and asylum policies

UK's Points-based system

All non-EU migrants are required a visa if they want to stay in the UK for more than a few months. Visas are subjects to a points-based system based on having a job offer, meeting a required salary, speaking English and having enough funds to cover maintenance. The points-based system includes five tiers, each of which comprises several different visa categories and some sub-categories, with associated conditions and eligibility requirements. The system has been [criticised](#) for being too complex, not enough transparent, objective and flexible.

Settlement Status

EU citizens living in the UK have time until 31 December 2020 to apply for settled status under the [EU settlement scheme](#). As of 15 October 2019, the [House of Commons Library](#) estimated 53% of EU nationals in Britain had applied for status under the scheme.

UK asylum policy

To seek asylum in the UK individuals must apply upon arrival and undertake an asylum interview. While waiting for the decision asylum-seekers are not entitled to work or claim benefits but can apply for housing and cash allowance. Only if granted refugee status individuals can work in the UK.

UK citizenship policy

To be granted UK citizenship individual must have lived in the country for a minimum of five years, have been granted the indefinite leave to remain status for the previous year, meet the English requirements and pass the 'Life in the United Kingdom' test.

- Since 2010 [restrictive measures](#) have been placed on almost every migration stream: high skilled routes were closed to people without a job offer, seasonal schemes terminated and a cap limited the number of Tier 2 visas issued annually. The Conservative Party committed themselves to **reducing net migration to the 'tens of thousands'** ahead of the 2010 general election. To reduce numbers Theresa May [institutionalised what has been called the hostile environment](#) aimed at discouraging illegal immigrants from come to the UK. In 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts were introduced and a variety of checks were introduced to prevent people accessing employment, [housing](#), banking and healthcare services, for example, without providing proof of their immigration status. Policymakers faced significant constraints and indeed failed in achieving this target due to the inability to change EU migration policy and freedom of movement in particular.
- Last year, the **UK government (led by the then PM Theresa May)** published a **White Paper which outlined a potential post-Brexit immigration system**, partly based on the recommendations made by the independent Migration Advisory Committee. This proposed to **abolish freedom of movement and instead treat all nationalities the same**, including the opportunity to apply for a Tier 2 visa for skilled workers which would require applicants to satisfy a number of criteria such as salary, occupation, skill-level and non-availability of workers from within the UK. It suggested the existing £30,000 threshold as the salary cap, though this seemed to be up for consultation, and currently the independent Migration Advisory Committee are reviewing the salary threshold. The proposal also included other measures such as a temporary work visa for migrants earning less than the salary cap, and perhaps some schemes to cover specific shortage occupations.

Conceptually, this would have resembled immigration systems outside the EU such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada, and ensured that migration focused predominantly of “skilled migrant workers”, though the salary threshold (which are above the UK average wage) would have hit many professions who are not usually seen as low-skilled.

- Immigration policy impact on different sectors and policy areas and changes of migration patterns driven by policy restrictions could exacerbate staffing shortages. We know that significant numbers of EU and other migrants work in public services such as health and education, and therefore these and other sectors are more vulnerable to the [potential effects of Brexit](#).

How the main parties compare on immigration?

- **Brexit** is on the agenda of all parties. The Conservatives have committed to **deliver Brexit** ending free movement for the EU. In contrast, the Liberal Democrats have promised to revoke Article 50, maintain freedom of movement, and extend full participation in civic life to EU citizens by allowing those who have lived in the UK for five years or longer to **vote in general elections**. Labour has indicated they will give the people the final say on Brexit by putting a **new deal to a public vote**, alongside the option to remain. If UK remains in the EU the freedom of movement will continue and if the UK leaves the EU the freedom of movement will be subject to negotiations. They also propose **automatic right to EU nationals to continue living and working in the UK**.
- The Conservatives promise to ‘fix’ the immigration system by proposing a point-based system inspired by Australian’s approach and deciding **who comes to the country on the basis of the skills they bring**. To attract ‘the best and brightest’ they propose fast-track NHS visa for those with job offers as well as science and technology visa, the start-up visa and post study work visa for graduated. The Liberal Democrats advance proposals on skills and jobs by suggesting **moving ‘policymaking on work permits and student visas out of the Home Office** and into the Departments for Business and Education respectively, and establish a new arms-length, non-political agency to take over processing applications.’ They also suggest replacing Tier 2 work visas with more flexible merit-based system, introducing a new two-year visa for students to work after graduation and giving asylum seekers the right to work three months after they have applied. They also propose to introduce ‘Training up Britain’ programme to make the most of migrants’ skills. Labour pledges **no minimum income requirement** as well as **equal worker rights** and a **Real Leaving Wage for all**. In the Labour’s vision the immigration system “must allow us to recruit the people we need, and to welcome them and their families. Our work visa system must fill any skills or labour shortages that arise. The movement of people around the world has enriched our society, our economy and our culture”. The Labour Party concretely committed to **close the immigration removal centres Yarl’s Wood and Brook House** and put savings in £20 million fund to support the survivors of modern slavery, people trafficking and domestic abuse.
- With respect to refugees and asylum seekers, the Liberal Democrats propose resettling 10,000 vulnerable refugees every year and 10,000 unaccompanied refugee children from elsewhere in EU over the next 10 years. They want to **‘move asylum policymaking from the Home Office to the Department for International Development** and establish a dedicated unit to speed and quality of decision making’. The Labour Party want to ‘work with others to resume rescue missions in the Mediterranean, co-operate with the French authorities to put an end to the horrific camps, and establish safe and legal routes for asylum seekers. The Conservatives suggest they will continue to


grant asylum and support to refugees but with the aim of “helping them to return home if it is safe to do so”. The Liberal Democrats suggest **limiting the Home Office powers**, recognising that managing migration require more than border control policies.

- Overall, given that Brexit would mark a turning point on UK immigration policy and give the next parliament a unique opportunity to reform the UK immigration system, it can be argued that this is not reflected in the details in the party manifestos, and it has **certainly not been reflected in how immigration has featured in the public debate so far during the election campaign**. Regardless of the outcome of this election, the exact design of Britain’s future immigration system is still not clear.

UK public opinion on immigration

- Coinciding with the large rises in net migration during the past two decades, immigration became a highly salient issue in the UK, with more people seeing **immigration as one of the most important issues facing the country**. Figure 6 shows how the importance of immigration as a political issue **declined during the economic crisis**, then **rose as economic concerns subsided and in the leadup to the EU referendum**. It then **declined following the referendum**, partly due to the rise in salience of related topics such as EU/Brexit. But while people have turned their attention to the UK’s future relationship with the EU, immigration is never far away from public consciousness, and it could quickly reappear at the centre of public debate, especially if the future immigration system is not deemed to respond to public concerns.

Figure 6: Net migration (000s) and salience of immigration (proportion of respondents, %)



Note: The figure shows net migration on the left axis derived from the Long-Term International Migration statistics (ONS, 2019), and on the right axis the proportion of survey respondents who see migration as one of the most important issues facing the UK (salience), according to Ipsos MORI’s latest issues index. Sources: Ipsos MORI (2019) and ONS (2019).

- Generally, **public opposition to immigration has been widespread** in the UK. While the salience and levels of immigration has changed over time, a [majority of the British public](#) **consistently wants to see immigration levels reduced**. But at the same time, attitudes towards economic and cultural impacts have **become more positive since the late 2010s and 2020s, especially after the Brexit referendum**, and among all political divides including among Remain and Leave voters. This may seem paradoxical, but it may be due to a reassurance effect that the issue is finally being addressed, or that the public debate has made people more aware of migrants' contributions. The human aspects of migration have also been highlighted through the debate about EU citizens' rights and the Windrush scandal. Overall, the UK public as a whole now has a **fairly balanced, and even positive, view on the impacts of immigration**.
- But while the UK public as a whole are now fairly balanced, most people do not actually seem to hold this balanced view: people are either positive or negative. In fact, according to polling, **Britain are among the most divided countries in Europe on immigration**, and these **divisions seem to be growing**. Britain are divided along education, generational and social lines. In particular, people with higher education tend to have more pro-immigration attitudes, and younger generations hold more pro-immigration views than older generations. These divisions mean it is hard to find a policy compromise which will satisfy everyone.
- However, it is often understated that there are areas where **large parts of the public can find common ground on immigration**. Most importantly, there is strong evidence that British people, regardless of their broader immigration attitudes, prefer some migrants over others. In particular, there is a **higher acceptance of high-skilled compared to low-skilled migrant workers**. This preference is related to the higher economic benefits of welcoming high-skilled migrants, due to their ability to support themselves through employment and paying taxes. This is the background for the typical **public support of an Australian-style points-based system which often appears to be shorthand for a controlled and selective immigration system**, in contrast to EU free movement.
- But recent [NIESR research](#) also suggests that the UK public, more fundamentally, **supports immigration when it is economically beneficial and socially useful rather than necessarily high-skilled**. People express support for low-skilled migrants when questioned about specific jobs rather than in generic terms as low-skilled, and readily acknowledge the contribution of some low-skilled professions in filling important labour market shortages. As such, it is arguably a misinterpretation of public opinion to set too strict restrictions on low-skilled immigration. The support for a controlled and selective immigration system also means that the policies that were concerned with reducing the number of migrants **probably misjudged public opinion which is more concerned with controlling migration to ensure that migrants contribute, rather than necessarily reducing numbers**.
- There is also evidence that the UK public, regardless of their broader immigration attitudes, show signs of the same implicit **'ethnic hierarchy'**, as they express **more support of White, English-speaking, European and Christian migrants**, compared to non-White, non-Europeans and Muslim migrants. This would suggest that future post-Brexit immigration policies should still treat EU citizens favourably, but research finds that the overriding concern among the public is the skill-level and therefore control and selectivity. Other factors such as country of origin and religion are secondary.

ⁱ ONS (2019) 'Understanding different migration data sources: August 2019 progress report'
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/articles/understandingdifferentmigrationdatasources/augustprogressreport>

ⁱⁱ There are some differences between the two surveys, for example, in the coverage and definition of migrants, and you cannot automatically estimate net migration from population numbers as these could also be affected by other factors such as deaths of migrants, but these factors cannot alone explain the substantial differences.

ⁱⁱⁱ See for example the articles in the National Institute Economic Review, August 2018
(<https://journals.sagepub.com/toc/nera/245/1>)