Research on employers’ hiring discrimination is limited by the unlawfulness of such activity. Consequently, researchers have focused on the intention to hire. Instead, we rely on a virtual labour market, the English Fantasy Football league, where employers can freely exercise their taste for racial discrimination in terms of hiring and firing. We find employers are less likely to hire black players than white players, even when accounting for time-varying player labour productivity and price.

Research on employers’ discrimination is limited by the unlawfulness of such activity. As such, researchers have focused on the intention to hire, rather than hiring decisions and wage settlements. Instead, we rely on a virtual labour market, the UK Fantasy Football league where employers can freely exercise their taste for racial discrimination in terms of hiring, firing workers. We find employers pick players who have performed well in previous games but they are less likely to pick the highest performing players if they are black.

Research on employers' discrimination is limited by the unlawfulness of such activity. As such, researchers have focused on the intention to hire, rather than hiring decisions and wage settlements. Instead, we rely on a virtual labour market, the UK Fantasy Football league, where employers can freely exercise their taste for racial discrimination in terms of hiring, firing and market valuation . We find black players are valued more highly than white players, but the difference disappears after controlling for on-field performance and other observable characteristics.