Bank Credit Conditions and their Influence on Productivity Growth: Company-level Evidence

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Motivation

- The productivity puzzle it remains unclear how and to what extent the lack of credit has affected productivity
- Difficult to disentangle what is a change in credit supply and what is a change in credit demand
- A credit supply shock may reduce labour productivity:
 - Bank forbearance (prevalence of zombie companies)
 - Resource reallocation across companies hampered
 - Reduction in investment due to difficulty in accessing finance



A Quasi-Experiment

- Exploit exogenous variation induced by the financial crisis in credit availability to companies to investigate impacts of credit supply shocks
- Compare outcomes for companies who were subjected to tougher credit constraints to outcomes for companies that were less likely to be constrained
 - Quasi-experimental approach
 - Divide firm observations into 'treatment' and 'control' groups based on main bank lender
 - Difficulty switching to a new lender during the crisis
- Provide direct estimates of the impact of credit constraints on UK firms
 - Here we consider impacts on firm survival and productivity




Related Literature

- Assessing the impact of credit constraints on real economic outcomes using variation in ease of access to external finance induced by the financial crisis in a natural experiment type approach
 - Employment, unemployment and firm closure
 - Bentolila, Jansen, Jiménez and Ruano, CEPR DP 9776, 2013.
 - Duygan-Bump, B., Levkov, A., and Montoriol-Garriga, J., Federal Reserve Bank of Boston QAU WP QAU10-6, 2011.
 - Investment
 - Almeida, H., Murillo, C., Laranjeira, B. and Weisbenner, S., NBER WP 14990, 2009.
 - Productivity
 - On-going research at the Bank of England (Franklin, J., Rostom, M., and Thwaites, G., 2013)
- The importance of financial circumstances for firms' investment decisions
 - Difficulties in assessment due to issues of reverse causation
 - See review by Bond, S. and J. Van Reenen (2007) in J. Heckman and E. Leamer, eds. Handbook of Econometrics
- Growing literature that seeks to understand the reasons for the current productivity puzzle



The Different Experiences of UK Banks




From the Large Review:

Having lent aggressively in the run-up to the crisis, RBS's lending volumes to SMEs have fallen faster than peers and its market share has contracted from an unsustainably high share in 2008, to a level more consistent with its customer base.

The Different Experiences of the Big Four UK Banks

Credit Default Swap Premia Differentials



Data: Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME)

- Company Accounts information held by Companies House
 - provided by Bureau Van Dijk
 - annual historical discs
 - subsidiaries removed from the dataset
- Chargeholder recorded
 - tells us which banks a company is borrowing from
- Data issues
 - selective reporting of key accounts information
 - reporting of employment and output is particularly sparse (for smaller companies)
 - decline over time in tendency to report detailed accounting information
 - self-reporting of SIC codes



Bank: borrowing company relationships are identified using information on registered charges

- Standard business practice is for banks to take all-monies debentures, secured by either fixed charges on particular assets or floating charges on all other assets of borrowing companies. Recognised as best form of security for lenders.
- Banks may require other security from the directors and may want their personal guarantees.
- Company Accounts record charge-holder information and hence the identity of lending banks

Bank SME forbearance project found:

- Chargeholder information is a reliable means of identifying lending relationships –
 of 4,500 borrowing companies identified in this way for one lender, only 21 were
 not recognised by lender
- Strong positive correlation between quantity of lending on banks' books and loans recorded in company accounts, and between implied aggregate lending for each bank and Bank aggregate data



Distressed Banks

LBG	RBS	Other
BANK OF SCOTLAND	NATIONAL WESTMINSTER BANK	AIB GROUP
LLOYDS TSB	ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND	GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF BANK OF IRELAND
LLOYDS BANK	ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND COMMERCIAL SERVICES	ANGLO IRISH BANK CORPORATION
TSB BANK	WESTMINSTER BANK	ALLIED IRISH BANKS
BANK OF WALES	RBS INVOICE FINANCE	CAPITAL HOME LOANS
HALIFAX	LOMBARD NORTH CENTRAL	FIRST TRUST BANK
HBOS	WILLIAMS & GLYN'S BANK	
TRUSTEE SAVINGS BANK	ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND SECURITY TRUSTEE	NORRN ROCK
TSB COMMERCIAL FINANCE	NATIONAL PROVINCIAL BANK	ALLIANCE & LEICESTER
TSB ENGLAND & WALES	ULSTER BANK	BRADFORD & BINGLEY BUILDING SOCIETY
TSB ASSET FINANCE		MORTGAGE EXPRESS

36% of companies with outstanding charges



Not Distressed Banks

HSBC	Other	
HSBC BANK	CLYDESDALE BANK	COUTTS & COMPANY
MIDLAND BANK	YORKSHIRE BANK	CLOSE BRORS
HSBC INVOICE FINANCE	CO-OPERATIVE BANK	CLOSE INVOICE FINANCE
HSBC INVOICE FINANCE SECURITY HOLDER	SANTANDER	SKIPTON BUILDING SOCIETY
	ABBEY NATIONAL	NORWICH UNION MORTGAGE FINANCE
Barclays	NATIONWIDE BUILDING SOCIETY	BIBBY FINANCIAL SERVICES
	MORTGAGE WORKS	VENTURE FINANCE
BARCLAYS BANK	PARAGON MORTGAGES	GRIFFIN CREDIT SERVICES
WOOLWICH	MORTGAGE TRUST	ROYAL TRUST CORPORATION OF CANADA TRUSTEE
	COUTTS & CO	SVENSKA HANDELSBANKEN AB PUBL

32% of companies with outstanding charges



Difference-in-differences set-up

- Treatment (T) and Control (C) group
 - T = Companies with an outstanding charge with a DISTRESSED BANK at the time the bank was rescued
 - C = Companies with an outstanding charge with a NOT DISTRESSED BANK at the same time
- Track difference in the development of outcomes between the T and C groups since bank rescue/financial crisis
 - FY 2007/8 or FY 2008/9 (PRE-period) FY 2011/12 or FY 2012/13 (POST-period)
- And compare this to differences in the development of outcomes between these two groups before the crisis

Difference-in-differences set-up (continued)

$$Y_{it} = cons + \beta_{DB} DB_{i} + \beta_{NDB} NDB_{i}$$
 $+ \gamma post + \gamma_{DB} post \times DB_{i} + \gamma_{NDB} post \times NDB_{i}$
 $+ controls_{it} + u_{i} + \varepsilon_{it}$

where $(\gamma_{DB} - \gamma_{NDB})$ identifies the effect of being stuck with a distressed bank.

Further interactions included to distinguish the treatment effect by additional characteristics

$$+\beta_{H}H_{i}+\gamma_{H}$$
 post $\times H_{i}+\alpha_{DB}H_{i}\times DB_{i}+\alpha_{NDB}H_{i}\times NDB_{i}+\lambda_{DB}$ post $\times H_{i}\times DB_{i}+\lambda_{NDB}$ post $\times H_{i}\times NDB_{i}$

where
$$(\lambda_{DB} - \lambda_{NDB}) + (\gamma_{DB} - \gamma_{NDB})$$

identifies the effect of being type H and stuck with a distressed bank.

PNFC Switching Between Lenders

Probability of changing lender

after:	1 year	2 years	3 years	4 years
All*	4.2	7.7	10.6	13.2
Big Four	3.3	6.1	8.6	10.7


Source: FAME BvD and authors' calculations.

Notes: Companies in the non-financial non-farm business sectors excluding the Mining and Real Estate industries. Companies who do not have an outstanding charge with any other lender. Big Four = RBS, Lloyds, HSBC, Barclays. Switching to another lender evaluated over the period 2001-2011.

*Switching between 15 categories of lender



Proportion of companies that take on a new charge in next year




Source: FAME BvD and authors' calculations.

Notes: Companies in the non-financial non-farm business sectors excluding the Mining and Real Estate industries.

Companies who do not have an outstanding charge with any other lender.



Proportion of companies that take on a new charge in next 4 years



Source: FAME BvD and authors' calculations.

Notes: Companies in the non-financial non-farm business sectors excluding the Mining and Real Estate industries.

Companies who do not have an outstanding charge with any other lender.




Key descriptives for groups of firms

	All		N	DB	DB	
	mean	median	mean	median	mean	median
Debt per head	116.0	24.4	56.2	18.4	65.8	20.2
Working Capital per head	48.5	13.4	29.3	13.4	33.3	12.6
Labour Productivity	41.1	33.2	38.0	32.8	39.1	33.3
Capital Labour Ratio	125.3	30.6	72.9	26.6	75.3	28.3
Employment	908 113		344 101		369 106	

Notes: Companies in the non-financial non-farm business sectors excluding the Mining and Real Estate industries. Companies who report all variables listed. Financial years 2006-2008.



Short term loans and overdrafts held by companies with outstanding charges in DISTRESSED and NOT DISTRESSED banks




Source: FAME BvD and authors' calculations.

Notes: Companies in the non-financial non-farm business sectors excluding the Mining and Real Estate industries.

Companies who do not have an outstanding charge with any other lender and who report their loans.



Median short term loans and overdrafts held by companies with outstanding charges in DISTRESSED and NOT DISTRESSED banks




Source: FAME BvD and authors' calculations.

Notes: Companies in the non-financial non-farm business sectors excluding the Mining and Real Estate industries.

Companies who do not have an outstanding charge with any other lender and who report their debt.



Median labour productivity for companies with outstanding charges in DISTRESSED and NOT DISTRESSED banks



Source: FAME BvD and authors' calculations.

Notes: Companies in the non-financial non-farm business sectors excluding the Mining and Real Estate industries.

Companies who do not have an outstanding charge with any other lender and who report their debt.



Diff-in-Diff coefficients for repeated cross-sections (2010-12 compared to 2006-8)

	2010-2012 v	vs 2006-2008	2006-2008 v	rs 2002-2004
	coeff	coeff pval		pval
Labour productivity	-0.024	(0.045)	-0.002	(0.857)
GVA	-0.078	(0.004)	-0.052	(0.101)
Debt per head	-0.055	(0.112)	-0.017	(0.618)
Debt (long and short)	-0.106	(0.011)	-0.064	(0.160)
Employment	-0.050	(0.063)	-0.038	(0.211)
Capital labour ratio	-0.063	(0.032)	0.025	(0.406)
Observations	27997		26180	

Notes: Companies in the non-financial non-farm business sectors excluding the Mining and Real Estate industries. Companies who do not have an outstanding charge with any other lender and who report short term loans and overdrafts. Control group equals companies with an outstanding charge with a not distressed bank. Treatment group equals companies with an outstanding charge with a distressed bank. Financial years 2010-12 compared to 2006-2008. 2-digit industry*year controls. Robust regression.

Sample Characteristics (loan sample 2006-8)

	NDB	DB		NDB	DB
Exit rate (4 years)	0.202	0.197	Start-up	0.070	0.080
Exit rate (3 years)	0.162	0.155	Young	0.280	0.288
Total asset distribution			Foreign owned	0.045	0.052
2nd quintile	0.050	0.028	Exporter	0.042	0.040
3rd quintile	0.115	0.078	Count court judgment 0-24 mths	0.042	0.045
4th quintile	0.271	0.252	Normal credit score	0.801	0.807
5th quintile	0.549	0.628	Short term gearing >50th pctile	0.442	0.449
Group accounts	0.032	0.039	Short term gearing >75th pctile	0.180	0.182
Full accounts	0.122	0.144			
Companies	64991	75789			

Notes: Companies in the non-financial non-farm business sectors excluding the Mining and Real Estate industries. Companies who do not have an outstanding charge with any other lender and who report short term loans and overdrafts. Control group equals companies with an outstanding charge with a not distressed bank. Treatment group equals companies with an outstanding charge with a distressed bank. Financial years 2006-2008.



Sample Characteristics (productivity sample 2006-8)

	NDB	DB		NDB	DB
Exit rate (4 years)	0.108	0.109	Start-up	0.043	0.046
Exit rate (3 years)	0.083	0.082	Young	0.144	0.156
Total asset distribution			Foreign owned	0.171	0.160
2nd quintile	0.007	0.003	Exporter	0.208	0.182
3rd quintile	0.021	0.015	Count court judgment 0-24 mths	0.037	0.045
4th quintile	0.059	0.047	Normal credit score	0.953	0.960
5th quintile	0.913	0.935	Short term gearing >50th pctile	0.356	0.356
Group accounts	0.186	0.198	Short term gearing >75th pctile	0.106	0.100
Full accounts	0.441	0.441	Labour productivity >50th pctile	0.539	0.559
			Labour productivity >75th pctile	0.239	0.247
Companies	10195	13566	, , ,		

Notes: Companies in the non-financial non-farm business sectors excluding the Mining and Real Estate industries. Companies who do not have an outstanding charge with any other lender and who report short term loans and overdrafts and for whom we can measure labour productivity and fixed assets. Control group equals companies with an outstanding charge with a not distressed bank. Treatment group equals companies with an outstanding charge with a distressed bank. Financial years 2006-2008.

Exit Rate effect of being with a nationalised bank

Exit period		Full sample	Loan sai	mple	Productivit	y sample			
4-year		0.006 *** (0.0019)	0.011***	(0.0037)	0.009	(0.0070)			
3-year		0.007 *** (0.0016)	0.009 ***	(0.0030)	0.005	(0.0053)			
	Leverage position						Productivity position		
4-year	BELOW 50th		0.010**	(0.0045)	0.018**	(0.0079)	BELOW 50th	-0.007	(0.0117)
4-year	ABOVE 50th		0.012*	(0.0061)	-0.007	(0.0135)	ABOVE 50th	0.023 **	* (0.0083)
3-year	BELOW 50th		0.011 ***	(0.0035)	0.013 **	(0.0058)	BELOW 50th	-0.003	(0.0086)
3-year	ABOVE 50th		0.007	(0.0051)	-0.012	(0.0104)	ABOVE 50th	0.012*	(0.0061)
4-year	BELOW 75th		0.013***	(0.0039)	0.014*	(0.0071)	BELOW 75th	0.008	(0.0085)
4-year	ABOVE 75th		0.002	(0.0103)	-0.027	(0.0275)	ABOVE 75th	0.016	(0.0112)
3-year	BELOW 75th		0.010 ***	(0.0031)	0.008	(0.0053)	BELOW 75th	0.006	(0.0064)
3-year	ABOVE 75th		0.006	(0.0085)	-0.022	(0.0210)	ABOVE 75th	0.000	(0.0083)

Notes: OLS regression; robust standard errors in brackets clustered by firm.

3-6 %points added to the exit rate



Exit Rate effects (pre-crisis falsification test)

Exit period		Full sa	ample	Loan sa	ample	Productiv	ity sample			
4-year		-0.002	(0.0019)	-0.003	(0.0034)	-0.008	(0.0067)			
3-year		-0.003 *	(0.0019)	-0.001	(0.0032)	-0.007	(0.0060)			
	Leverage position							Productivity position		
4-year	BELOW 50th			-0.001	(0.0044)	-0.003	(0.0078)	BELOW 50th	-0.004	(0.0109)
4-year	ABOVE 50th			-0.006	(0.0058)	-0.016	(0.0131)	ABOVE 50th	-0.012	(0.0085)
3-year	BELOW 50th			0.000	(0.0039)	-0.005	(0.0067)	BELOW 50th	-0.008	(0.0099)
3-year	ABOVE 50th			-0.002	(0.0054)	-0.011	(0.0119)	ABOVE 50th	-0.006	(0.0073)
4-year	BELOW 75th			0.000	(0.0037)	-0.005	(0.0069)	BELOW 75th	-0.009	(0.0080)
4-year	ABOVE 75th			-0.018*	(0.0098)	-0.036	(0.0261)	ABOVE 75th	-0.005	(0.0124)
3-year	BELOW 75th			0.001	(0.0034)	-0.003	(0.0061)	BELOW 75th	-0.010	(0.0072)
3-year	ABOVE 75th			-0.011	(0.0093)	-0.036	(0.0238)	ABOVE 75th	0.003	(0.0105)

Notes: OLS regression; robust standard errors in brackets clustered by firm.



Exit Rates by Big-4 Lender (Bilateral Comparisons)

	Ва	ank						
Exit period	Treatment	Comparison	Full san	nple	Loan san	nple	Productiv	ity sample
4-year	RBS	HSBC	0.008 ***	(0.0026)	0.015 ***	(0.0053)	0.009	(0.0113)
4-year	LBG	HSBC	0.007 **	(0.0031)	0.018 ***	(0.0062)	0.011	(0.0124)
4-year	Barclays	HSBC	-0.002	(0.0030)	0.006	(0.0060)	-0.003	(0.0118)
4-year	RBS	Barclays	0.010 ***	(0.0028)	0.009	(0.0054)	0.012	(0.0094)
4-year	LBG	Barclays	0.009 ***	(0.0033)	0.013 **	(0.0063)	0.014	(0.0107)
4-year	RBS	Lloyds	0.001	(0.0029)	-0.004	(0.0056)	-0.002	(0.0101)
3-year	RBS	HSBC	0.009 ***	(0.0023)	0.015 ***	(0.0044)	0.008	(0.0085)
3-year	LBG	HSBC	0.008 ***	(0.0028)	0.023 ***	(0.0051)	0.011	(0.0095)
3-year	Barclays	HSBC	0.000	(0.0027)	0.012 **	(0.0050)	0.003	(0.0091)
3-year	RBS	Barclays	0.009 ***	(0.0024)	0.003	(0.0044)	0.004	(0.0072)
3-year	LBG	Barclays	0.008 ***	(0.0028)	0.011 **	(0.0052)	0.008	(0.0083)
3-year	RBS	Lloyds	0.001	(0.0025)	-0.008	(0.0046)	-0.004	(0.0077)

Notes: OLS regression; robust standard errors in brackets clustered by firm.

Summary

- Companies that borrowed from banks that became distressed (and nationalised) were
 - more likely to exit the market in the years following nationalisation compared to a counterfactual where they had borrowed from a bank that did not become distressed
- Some evidence that nationalised banks differed from other banks in contributing to the exit of
 - Lower leverage companies
 - Higher productivity companies
- Productivity in surviving companies
 - Looking at companies that stay in business we do not detect a general effect on short term loans, capital intensity, or productivity of being associated with a distressed bank (comparing several years before and after the crisis)
 - Data weaknesses may be contributing to this (mainly larger firms)
 - Some negative effects on debt and capital stocks for smaller (defined by total assets) companies?
 - Small sample sizes, unbalanced panel.
 - Separately, focusing on highly leveraged companies



Surviving firms (unbalanced panel, outside top 10 percent of asset distribution)

	2010-2012 vs 2006-2008				
	coeff	pval			
Labour productivity	0.128	(0.325)			
GVA	0.114	(0.565)			
Debt (long and short)	-0.028	(0.645)			
Debt (long)	-0.656	(0.034)			
Employment	0.096	(0.566)			
Capital labour ratio	-0.383	(0.214)			
Capital stock	-0.444	(0.067)			
Observations	920				

Notes: Companies in the non-financial non-farm business sectors excluding the Mining and Real Estate industries. Companies who do not have an outstanding charge with any other lender and who report all variables shown. Control group equals companies with an outstanding charge with a not distressed bank in 2006-2008. Treatment group equals companies with an outstanding charge with a distressed bank in 2006-2008. Financial years 2010-12 compared to 2006-2008. 2-digit industry*year controls. Robust regression.

Conclusions

- Did a credit supply shock contribute to a reduction in productivity?
 - Maybe yes, by contributing to the exit of potentially productive companies
 - Less differential across banks in contribution to exit of high leverage companies
 - Evidence of forbearance?
 - Or is it just that high leverage companies are more likely to exit in a recession (regardless of the lender)?
- Are credit constraints a key driver of recent productivity weakness?
 - Key explanations of recent productivity weakness need to be able to explain the weakness of productivity within companies
 - No obvious negative correlation at the sector level between the productivity deviation from trend and bank dependence
- To what extent are these results applicable more widely?
 - Not clear that we can extrapolate from this experiment to credit shocks more generally
 - Banks could de-leverage in alternate ways.
 - Credit tightening by good banks might also have contributed to productivity weakness.
 - Data issues.



Context: Accounting for the labour productivity gap

Labour productivity growth 2007-12 less labour productivity growth 2002-7										
	Total	Within	Reallocation	share within						
Accommodation & Food	-0.125	-0.179	0.054	1.43						
Construction	-0.206	-0.083	-0.122	0.41						
Wholesale & Retail	-0.248	-0.194	-0.054	0.78						
Manufacturing	-0.272	-0.204	-0.068	0.75						
Transport & Storage	-0.125	-0.205	0.080	1.64						
Arts & Entertainment	-0.266	-0.172	-0.093	0.65						
Administration & Support	-0.020	0.082	-0.102	-4.07						
Professional & Scientific	-0.251	-0.302	0.051	1.20						
Information & Communication	-0.417	-0.414	-0.003	0.99						
All	-0.212	-0.174	-0.038	0.82						

Source: ARD and authors' calculations.

Notes: Diewert-Fox Hybrid composition of GR and MP.



Context: Reallocation in manufacturing (now and then)

Relationship between employment growth and productivity deviations from industry/year mean						
	Change in log(1+E) (All firms)		Change in log(1+E) (Continuers)		Survival probabilit	ту
(Note - changes/survival measured over next 5 years)						
productivity deviation	0.0015	-0.3380	0.0032	0.0000	0.0006	-0.1670
productivity deviation*(2002 or 2007)	0.0069	-0.0020	0.0005	-0.5740	0.0014	-0.0100
productivity deviation*(1989 or 2007)	0.0012	-0.6490	0.0007	-0.4340	0.0007	-0.3080
productivity deviation*(2007)	-0.0045	-0.1630	-0.0028	-0.0190	-0.0013	-0.0810
Sample size	33701		20383		33701	

Notes:

Start years included in the sample: 1984, 1989, 2002, 2007;

Industry*year effects included; OLS; robust standard errors; p-values in brackets;

Observations weighted to population totals.